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Explaining property tax collections
in developing countries: the case of
Latin America
Cristian Sepulveda and
Jorge M artinez-Vazquez*

1

INTRODUCTION

T he property tax is arguably the m ost im portant source o f own revenues
for local governm ents aro u n d the w orld. M any fiscally decentralized econ
om ies as well as an increasing num ber o f countries that have em barked
upon a decentralization process look at the property tax as the main
source o f revenue autonom y for their subnational governm ents. T his prac
tice is well m atched with policy principles. T here is widespread agreem ent
am ong econom ists and decentralization experts that, although n o t entirely
perfect, the property tax possesses several characteristics th at are desirable
in the context o f subnational governm ent finance.
Besides its theoretical advantages, however, in practice all is not well
with the p roperty tax. It is difficult to im plem ent, costly to adm inister, and
u npopular am ong taxpayers. It is well know n th at m any countries around
the world struggle to produce any significant am ounts o f revenue from
this tax source. These difficulties are m ore prevalent am ong developing
countries an d , particularly in L atin A m erica, the property tax continues
to be a predom inant policy concern am ong policy makers. W ith very
few exceptions, Latin A m erican countries have not been able to develop
revenue-productive prop erty tax systems. M oreover, Latin A m erica has
been identified in the econom ic literature as a region with relatively low tax
effort (Bird et al., 2006), an d with a level o f tax revenue perform ance that
is lower than the average in developing and transition countries (A hm ad
and Brosio, 2008; Bird et al., 2008). T he problem s o f low tax effort and
revenue perform ance are especially acute and challenging in the case o f
the property tax.
T he main objective o f this chap ter is to analyze the causes o f the poor
tax perform ance o f the property tax in Latin A m erica and to identify
172
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policies th at could help with the current impasse. Part o f what we find is
conventional wisdom. T he lack o f financial an d technical m eans to assem 
ble accurate, com prehensive and updated cadastres (property registers)
is clearly one o f the m ain reasons explaining the lackluster perform ance
o f the property tax. In fact, there is an extensive literature addressing
these issues and suggesting m ore feasible alternatives to the assessment of
property values. All these lessons are relevant to Latin A m erica and they
should be internalized by policy m akers. But we also arrive at less conven
tional findings. Previous analyses o f the perform ance o f the property tax
have given m uch less atten tio n to the design o f the fiscal decentralization
system within which th e property tax m ust operate. T he arrangem ent o f
fiscal incentives in the decentralization system, we contend, can also play
a crucial role in determ ining the extent to which the p roperty tax is used
in practice. We argue th a t the realignm ent o f fiscal incentives must be an
im portant part o f the solution for a m ore effective use o f the property tax
in the region.
We em phasize the m utual dependence between a sound fiscal decen
tralization process an d the successful devolution o f the property tax to
local governm ents. In order to become a productive revenue source, the
decentralization o f the property tax also requires that local authorities
be politically accountable to their com m unities, be endow ed with a sig
nificant degree o f fiscal autonom y, face the correct incentives within the
context o f central governm ent policies, an d have sufficient adm inistrative
capacity to carry out tax and expenditure policies.
A few words on the scope o f the ch ap ter are in order. T he concept o f
property is a broad one, encom passing different forms o f wealth over
which different taxes can be applied. In general, we can differentiate
between real or im m ovable property, which includes land and structures,
from personal property, consisting o f those tangible and intangible assets
th at are not attached to the land. In addition, taxes can be applied to the
stock o f properties, their transfer, or the capital gains realized on their
sale. T his chapter focuses on the annual taxation o f the stock o f im m ov
able property, which is generally considered am ong the m ost efficient
m odes o f property taxation and constitutes the bulk o f property tax
revenues around the w o rld .1
In this chapter we also distinguish between the analysis o f property
tax collections at the subnational level within a country and th at across
countries. We explain that certain variables that are exogenous for sub
national governm ents w ithin a country, such as the legal and institutional
fram ew orks, are likely to be endogenously determ ined at the country level,
and thus they should also be considered as com ponents o f the national
tax effort. U nfortunately, the inform ation available at the subnational
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governm ent level is, in general, still very limited, so the econom etric
analysis tends to be m ore inform ative at the international level. M oreover,
even in th a t case, the d a ta available for Latin Am erican countries are
quite incom plete, which naturally limits the validity of our results. O ur
dataset consists of an unbalanced panel o f nine countries with years o f
observation covering the 1990-2007 period.
We suggest that the im provem ent o f property tax collections and the
realization o f effective revenue au to n o m y m ay require, paradoxically, a
m ore active involvem ent o f the central governm ent in the im plem entation,
adm inistration and collection o f the property tax. The central govern
m ents in the region m ight provide technical and financial assistance to
the less adm inistratively developed local governm ents, and in some cases
might tem porarily retain some responsibilities over different aspects o f
this revenue source. In addition, the central governm ent could contribute
by helping to strengthen the relationship between autonom y and account
ability at the subnational level, and by redesigning the intergovernm en
tal transfer systems in a way th at does not provide incentives to reduce
subnational ow n-tax collections.
The rest o f the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide
an overview o f the m ain characteristics and im portance o f the property
tax in Latin America. In Section 3 we evaluate the property tax in terms of
the desirable properties o f a good subnational tax. In Section 4 we develop
an analytical fram ew ork in which we identify the determ ining factors of
tax collection perform ance o f subnational governm ents. This analytical
fram ew ork provides a sounder basis for the com parison o f perform 
ances o f subnational governm ents w ithin a country and across different
countries, where perform ance is m easured on the basis o f actual revenue
collections vis-a-vis the potential collections reflected by existing fiscal
capacities. In Section 5 we present the em pirical analysis. The last section
concludes.

2

PROPERTY T A X A T I O N IN LATIN A ME R IC A

D espite the generally accepted potential o f property taxes in tax systems
all over the w orld, in practice they are a m inor source o f public revenues,
specially by com parison to other taxes also com m only used worldwide
such as incom e taxes, V A T or sales taxes. T he property tax is especially
far from being a m ainstay o f the revenue system in developing and
transitional countries.
T o put the perform ance o f p roperty taxes in Latin A m erica into per
spective, we com pare it with the perform ance o f other regions o f the
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Property ta x as a share o f GDP in representative groups o f
countries (% )

All countries
(number o f countries)
O EC D countries
(number o f countries)
Transition countries
(number o f countries)
Developing countries
(number o f countries)
Latin American countries
(number o f countries)

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s*

0.77
(37)
1.24
(16)
0.34

0.73
(49)
1.31
(18)
0.59
(4)
0.36
(27)

0.75
(59)
1.44
(16)
0.54
(20)
0.42
(23)
0.36
(8)

1.04
(65)
2.12
(18)
0.68
(18)
0.60
(29)
0.37
(10)

(1)
0.42
' (20)

-

Note: Figures in parentheses represent the number o f countries considered in each
com putation.
* The data for 2000s are for five years from 2000 to 2004.
Sources:

Bahl and M artinez-Vazquez (2008) and CEPAL.

w orld. As shown in Table 7.1, property taxes in developing and transi
tional countries raise less revenue relative to G D P than O E C D countries.
In the early 2000s property taxes in O E C D countries represented 2.12
percent o f G D P , while for developing countries this figure was 0.6 percent
and, for transition countries, 0.68 percent. T he trend for revenues in all
three groups o f countries has been slightly upw ards since the 1970s. The
figures in Table 7.1 suggest th at the overall perform ance o f the property
tax in term s o f G D P is associated with the level o f econom ic development;
for exam ple, O E C D countries rely more on the property tax than do devel
oping countries. H ow ever, that relationship is not necessarily m onotonic
and Latin A m erican countries are found to perform less well than the
average developing country.
T able 7.2 presents the m easures o f property tax perform ance for some
Latin A m erican countries. Even though the reliance on the property tax
is low, there is still a significant degree o f variation across countries. For
exam ple, in Peru p roperty tax revenues in recent years (2005-07) repre
sent 0.16 percent o f G D P , while in Bolivia (Plurinational State of) for
the same period th a t figure is about four times larger, at 0.62 percent of
G D P . T here is no clear trend over time but on average the relative im por
tance o f property taxes has decreased. T here are also some cases where
property tax perform ance has consistently increased over time, such as
in Brazil, C olom bia, E cuador and G uatem ala; while in Mexico property
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Table 7.2

Reliance on the property ta x as a share o f GDP in Latin
American countries

Argentina
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Guatemala
Mexico
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Latin American countries
Source:

1990-94

1995-99

2000-04

2005-07

0.65

0.62

0.59
0.69
0.42
0.70
0.48
0.13
0.14
0.18
0.39
0.17
0.71
0.38

0.44
0.62
0.44
0.59
0.54
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.16

-

0.37
0.55
0.25
0.10
0.09
0.18
-

0.52
0.33

0.41
0.65
0.46
0.13
0.07
0.18
0.36
-

0.70
0.40

-

0.36

CEPAL.

taxes have represented 0.18 percent o f G D P , w ithout changing since the
early 1990s.
C entral to this chapter is the question o f which factors m ay help explain
variations in the use o f pro p erty taxes in Latin America. It seems quite
certain th at property taxes rem ain the great unrealized prom ise for local
tax autonom y. Like in some oth er regions o f the world, the yield o f the
property tax rem ains lower than its potential; but in Latin America
the distance between potential and reality appears to be m uch larger,
an d the reasons for this are m ultiple. In this chapter we explore several
o f these, including low political will and disincentive effects o f revenue
sharing and transfers, and o u td ated and poorly equipped tax adm inistra
tions. These factors w ould seem to translate into generous exem ptions
an d low tax rates, obsolete and infrequent property value assessments,
incom plete registries and cadastres and lack o f willingness and m eans o f
enforcing collections.
This lackluster perform ance o f p roperty taxes in Latin A m erica and
the differences observed am ong countries are likely to be related to the
different arrangem ents for discretion on rate setting o r adm inistration o f
the property tax. Some o f the m ain institutional features in the assign
ment and adm inistration o f the p roperty tax across Latin American
countries are presented in A ppendix T able 7A .1.2 F o r the m ost part, Latin
A m erican countries assign the p roperty tax to m unicipal governm ents,
although there are ‘full’ exceptions such as the case o f the D om inican
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Republic where this tax rem ains a central tax, and ‘partial’ exceptions
where some au th o rity over taxes rem ains at the central level (for example,
Brazil for rural taxes, G uatem ala, and Panam a) or at the provincial level
(A rgentina). In m ost cases, m unicipalities are also given some authority to
change tax rates, a t times within legislated limits, but here there are also
exceptions. F or exam ple, Chile does not give that au thority to the m unici
palities, an d the states o r provinces in Mexico and A rgentina also share in
that authority. F o r the adm inistration o f the tax, the central governm ents
(the provinces in the case o f A rgentina) are m ost frequently responsible for
updating the cadastre', in C osta Rica, H onduras, and Mexico the cadastre
is a municipal function. In terms o f assigning the responsibility for billing
and collections there are a large variety o f practices with these functions
at tim es exclusively assigned to the central or municipal governm ents and
other times shared by different levels o f governm ent. Finally, the predom i
nant ap proach to the assessment o f properties is m arket valuation.
A priori, we can theorize on the positive and negative aspects o f the
assignm ent o f specific functions vis-a-vis the revenue productivity o f pro p 
erty taxes. For exam ple, the assignm ent o f adm inistrative functions at the
m unicipal level may have certain advantages, such as better inform ation
ab o u t the properties and potentially stronger incentives to collect taxes,
but the central authorities might also have advantages, such as betterskilled and better-rem unerated officials and stronger authority to m ake
things happen. In the next section we explore in m ore depth the role of
property taxation in financing local governm ents and the advantages
and disadvantages o f different adm inistrative schemes. Ultim ately, we
shall rely on our em pirical analysis to discern the direction and statistical
significance o f the effects o f different adm inistrative arrangem ents on tax
collections from the property tax.

3

THE ROLE OF PROPERTY T A XA TI ON ON LOCAL
GOVERNM ENT FINANCING

T here is w idespread agreem ent am ong econom ists and policy m akers
ab o u t the ap p ropriateness and convenience of assigning the property
tax to local governm ents. Indeed, while the theoretical norm ative analy
ses developed in the econom ic literature suggest that the property tax
is a good source o f local governm ent revenue, in practice most o f the
decentralized econom ies in the w orld have assigned, at least partially, the
responsibility over the property tax to local governm ents. This m atching
o f theory and practice, however, does not imply that the decentralization
o f the property tax has always been carried out in accordance with the
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norm ative prescriptions developed in the econom ic literature. In many
cases, either because o f the difficulties associated with its im plem entation,
or because o f poorly designed incentives, the property tax has n o t become
a significant source o f revenues.
The econom ic role currently assigned to property taxation has been
shaped by a vast and longstanding literature analyzing the advantages and
disadvantages o f alternative tax revenue sources. In this section we briefly
describe the econom ic argum ents used to recom m end the property tax
as one o f the m ajor sources o f own local governm ent revenues. We start
by discussing the general characteristics o f good tax revenue sources, in
general and at the local level, and then we briefly stress the im portance of
tax revenue autonom y in a decentralized system o f governm ent.
A Preliminary Evaluation o f Subnational Property Taxation

T ax policy is carried out in com plex environm ents where institutional,
cultural, political, and econom ic variables interact in order to determ ine
not only the econom ic effects o f certain tax instrum ents, but also their fea
sibility as policy tools. In reality, there are no easy answers regarding the
desirability o f one tax instrum ent over an o th er, and econom ists usually
rely on a set o f widely accepted criteria or principles in order to describe a
‘good tax’ and evaluate the ap p ropriateness o f alternative tax instrum ents.
A m ong the m ost com m only used principles we find the following:
•

•

Efficiency A tax should not induce significant behavioral responses
o f individuals and firms; in o th er w ords, it should not distort the
adequate allocation o f resources in the econom y. W hen taxpayers
bear their burden in accordance with the benefit they receive (that
is, when the ‘benefit principle' is fulfilled) then the tax approxim ates
the role o f a user fee and is considered as an efficient tax. Indeed,
the behavioral responses induced by (rightly set) user fees can be
interpreted as the result o f a correcting incentive (sim ilar to what
happens in private m arkets), because the adjustm ent in the behavior
o f the individual or the firm is m ade in order to pay the correct price
o f the public good.
Equity and fairness T he principle o f horizontal equity calls for (or
regards as fair) an equal treatm ent o f taxpayers in identical condi
tions. In contrast, the concept o f vertical equity allows for several
possible arrangem ents in w hich a tax can be said to be regressive,
proportional or progressive as long as the tax burden increases in
a lower, equal or higher p ro p o rtio n with the ability to pay. The
ability-to-pay principle states th at taxpayers with greater ability to
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pay should b ear a greater tax burden, but the judgm ent on w hat is
to be considered fair is a m atter to be solved by each com m unity or
society. In any case, in order to become a good revenue source, a tax
should be considered fair by the taxpayers.
Revenue adequacy A tax should raise a significant am ount o f rev
enues relative to the costs o f collection and expenditure needs o f a
governm ent. In addition, the tax base should be stable and rather
insensitive to cyclical fluctuations.
Low costs o f administration and compliance A dm inistration costs
reduce the share o f tax collections available to finance public goods
an d services. Similarly, com pliance costs reduce the share o f taxpay
ers’ income available for private consum ption. If these costs are
relatively high then other tax revenue sources might be preferable.
Political acceptability A tax that is not acceptable either to the tax
payers or to a significant portion o f the political class might simply
be impossible to im plem ent. Even if it is im plem ented, in order to be
successful, a tax requires a high degree o f cooperation o f all relevant
agents an d institutions. Failing to reach this cooperation might
result in low voluntary com pliance, inadequate o r unrealistic laws,
an d deficient enforcem ent.
M inimize ta x avoidance and tax evasion A tax should not induce
significant, legal or illegal, efforts to elude the tax burden. Both
types o f responses erode the tax base, create deviations from the ta r
geted incidence, d istort the relative prices in the econom y and might
aggravate problem s in horizontal and vertical equity.

N o tax instrum ent perfectly fulfills all these principles nor could it be
considered as superior to all alternative tax instrum ents in all conditions.
In reality, although these principles of taxation serve as a guide to describe
the characteristics o f a ‘good’ tax instrum ent, they m ust be evaluated
in the specific context where a tax is im plem ented. A general evaluation
o f the property tax, therefore, can be expected to lead to different conclu
sions depending o n its structure, w hether the property tax is assigned to
the central governm ent or to the local governm ents, and so on.
T able 7.3 sum m arizes the relative advantages and disadvantages o f
assigning the p ro p erty tax to the central or to the local governm ents.’
Local governm ents have an advantage in terms o f econom ic efficiency
because their proxim ity to the taxpayers allows them to better fulfill the
benefit principle. Indeed, the central governm ent is m ore subject to
the ‘com m on pool p ro b lem ’, by which those who contribute to financing
the public goods (th e country as a whole if the tax is assigned to the center)
are not necessarily the beneficiaries o f public expenditures. In general, the
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Table 7.3

Comparative analysis o f property taxation at the central and
local levels o f government

Principle

Property tax as a central
government tax

Property tax as a local
government tax

Efficiency

Disadvantage: the
‘com m on pool
problem’ increases
with the size o f the
government
Advantage', both vertical
and horizontal
disparities can be
addressed at a national
level
Advantage: less mobility
and variability at the
national level
Advantage: better
administrative and
fiscal capacity
Disadvantage: econom ies
o f scale might not be
substantial

Advantage: the property
tax approximates a user
fee, especially as the
jurisdiction size decreases

Equity and fairness

Revenue adequacy

Low administration
costs

Low compliance
costs
Political acceptability

Tax compliance

Source:

Disadvantage:
heterogeneity and different
tax bases im pose unequal
conditions in different
jurisdictions
Disadvantage: revenues can
be more volatile in smaller
jurisdictions
Disadvantage:
implementation costs
might simply be
unaffordable
Advantage: first-hand
knowledge o f the
taxpayers and the tax base
(Depend on the complexity o f the system and the
taxpayers’ willingness to contribute)
Disadvantage: the
Advantage: visibility
property tax is very
helps to link taxation with
visible
public goods benefits and
increases accountability
Disadvantage: inflexible
Advantage: closer match o f
terms and ‘com m on
taxpayers’ preferences and
good problem’
better knowledge o f their
reduce willingness to
ability to pay
contribute

A uthors'elaboration.

lower the size o f the ju risdiction and the greater the share o f the property
tax on local revenues, the greater the ability o f local governm ents to use
property tax atio n as a benefit tax.
The central governm ent seems to have a clear advantage in terms o f
the ability to address the problem s o f horizontal and vertical equity and
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fairness. Since M usgrave (1959) the econom ic literature distinguishes m ac
roeconom ic stability, an equitable distribution o f income and the efficient
allocation o f resources as the three fundam ental economic objectives of
the (general) governm ent, and broadly accepts that local involvement
should be restricted only (or mostly) to contribute to the objective o f
allocation efficiency. T he reason is that local authorities cannot consider
the m acroeconom ic consequences o f their decisions, nor are they capable
of, o r interested in, ensuring fairness in the national context. According
to this argum ent, local governm ents should not even intervene in redis
tributive policies w ithin their own jurisdictions, but rather might limit
themselves to avoiding w orsening the distribution o f income at the local
level.4 T his consideration is especially relevant in Latin Am erica, a region
where the distribution o f income is am ong the worst in the world (Lopez
and Perry, 2008).5
Independently from the relative m agnitude o f property tax collections,
the fact th at m obility is lower at the national level implies th at the prop
erty tax collections w ould be m ore stable for the central governm ent. At
the local level individual taxpayers can m ove out as a response to exces
sive tax rates and low er the m arket value o f properties. Firm s might also
decide to leave the ju risdiction and in that case, in addition to the property
value effect, the loss in tax collections would be greater if com m ercial use
is taxed m ore heavily than residential use.
D ue to their potentially significant m agnitude, the adm inistration costs
play a crucial role in determ ining the ability o f a governm ent to adequately
implem ent and collect the property tax. In particular, the assessment o f
property values is com plex and requires well-prepared personnel; building
a com plete cadastre is a long and expensive task. In this context the central
governm ent usually has advantages in term s o f its ability to finance and
develop com prehensive cadastres. M oreover, local au thorities in develop
ing countries usually lack the enforcem ent mechanisms available to central
governm ents, such as legal staff, the police, and other means to take
advantage o f their proxim ity to tax officials and taxpayers.
Im portantly, local property taxation might also have an advantage in
term s o f the political acceptability. O ne paym ent (or a few) per year o f a
relatively large am o u n t o f m oney m akes the property tax a visible and an
u n p opu lar revenue source. Local authorities are in a better position than
the central governm ent to show the taxpayers the way in which property
tax revenues are used to finance public services, and therefore to justify the
tax paym ents as a fair price for the benefits received. If local authorities
m anage to effectively m atch public service provision with the preferences
o f the com m unity, then the taxpayers m ight well feel inclined to voluntar
ily com ply with the tax law, reducing the practice o f tax evasion. In this
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sense, an adequate supply o f public services might provide incentives to
taxpayers to remain in the jurisdiction even if tax rates are relatively high
with respect to neighboring areas. T he local authorities also have a better
know ledge o f the taxpayers’ ability to pay inside the jurisdiction; thus they
might be able to better m on ito r and enforce com pliance as well as make
proper adjustm ents to the local tax policy. T orgler (2005b) finds that the
size o f the inform al sector is an im p o rtan t determ inant o f tax com pliance
in Latin America. T he inform al sector represents an im p o rtan t share o f
the econom y in developing countries, and in L atin Am erica is estim ated
to be aro u n d 41 percent o f the G N P (Aim and M artinez-V azquez, 2007).
The question is w hether local governm ents can exploit their advantage o f
being ‘closer’ to the constituencies in o rd er to bring m ore activities into
the form al sector and encourage increased voluntary com pliance. Little
research has been done on this issue.
In sum m ary, both central and local governm ents have advantages and
disadvantages for adm inistering the prop erty tax, and it is not possible
to assert a priori which level will perform better. In practice, however,
their strengths can be com bined in mixed arrangem ents o f au thority and
responsibilities. On the one hand, the visibility o f the property tax, usually
considered as a disadvantage for the central governm ent, is a key aspect o f
the problem that calls for a keen p articipation o f local authorities in rate
setting and also in the adm inistration o f the property tax. At the local level
the tax authorities might be able to use such visibility to present the prop
erty tax as a benefit tax, enhancing political acceptability and taxpayers’
p articipation in local decisions, and potentially reducing non-com pliance.
On the o th e r hand, central governm ent intervention m ight be helpful to
develop com prehensive cadastres, to assist in the form ation o f adm inistra
tive capacity and to provide policy param eters within which the creation
o f inefficiencies can be contained.
The literature has identified a num ber o f additional desirable features o f
a ‘good local ta x ’.6 A m ong these features we count, again, the correspond
ence between tax paym ents and benefits received (benefit principle), the
perception o f fairness, an d the stability o f revenue collections. In addition,
and pondering some o f the argum ents provided earlier in this section,
the visibility o f the tax instrum ent is considered as a good characteristic
o f local taxation. O ther desirable features th at are applicable specifically
within the local context are:
•

The ta x base should be relatively immovable A ccording to the
T ieb o u t’s (1956) hypothesis, taxpayers would ‘vote w ith their feet’
and efficiently reallocate themselves after considering the com bina
tion o f taxes and services offered by different local governm ents.
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In practice, however, tax com petition am ong subnational govern
m ents m ight also lead to a 'race to the b o tto m ’, if local governm ents
are forced to reduce their tax rates in order to retain the taxpayers
inside the jurisdiction. As a result, the overall am ount o f subnational
public expenditures may remain a t a suboptim al level.7 A con
sensual, but ra th e r conservative, position to deal with the unclear
effects o f m obility in econom ic efficiency consists o f assum ing that
any fiscally induced change in taxpayers’ behavior represents a dis
tortio n o f the efficient allocation o f resources in the econom y and
consequently reduces econom ic welfare. M oreover, it is clear that
a relatively im m ovable tax base would allow for m ore room in tax
policy decisions.
The ta x should be geographically neutral Taxes should not interfere
with the com m ercial flow o f goods and services and business loca
tion decisions across the jurisdictions. In this case we again assume
th at tax-induced changes o f taxpayers’ behavior should be avoided.
Taxes should not be easily exported The benefit principle does not
hold if non-residents are charged for the provision o f local services.
In addition, such a situation implies th at the costs assum ed locally
are reduced, which might also lead to overprovision o f public
services.
Significant ta x revenue sources should be evenly distributed among
jurisdictions Sizable variations in the size o f the tax base create
high fiscal disparities am ong jurisdictions and im pose undesirable
differences in the degree o f revenue autonom y. In general, local gov
ernm ents w ith m ore (less) revenue autonom y are also able to exert
m ore (less) discretion in their expenditure decisions, and this might
translate into greater (lower) ability to tailor the public service p ro 
vision to the preferences o f the com m unity. G reat differences in the
size o f the tax base, therefore, might generate discontent and even
confusion regarding the im portance o f ow n-revenue collections and,
in general, the role o f local governm ents in a decentralized system.

The extent to which these conditions hold, o r are adhered to in practice,
is likely to vary from one tax instrum ent to another. In general, it seems
reasonable to expect th at only some taxes, if any, will satisfy all o f them.
F o r instance, there are few taxes that satisfy the benefit principle and are
not exportable, am ong which the property tax and the tax on vehicles
stand as the m ost typical examples. However, both o f these are subject
to tax com petition, which can create econom ic inefficiencies and erode
the tax bases. In additio n , in m ost cases the m agnitude o f the tax base
varies significantly across jurisdictions, particularly between urban and
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rural areas. In this sense, we can also expect a certain degree o f correlation
between the size o f the tax base and the adm inistrative capacity o f the local
governm ent, such that the initial disparities are aggravated by the relative
difficulties in raising local revenues.
All things considered, the p roperty tax represents a prom ising but still
im perfect source o f own revenues at the local level. Even with significant
decentralization o f the p roperty tax, poo rer local governm ents will likely
rem ain dependent on alternative sources o f revenues, notably intergov
ernm ental transfers. In addition, special attention will be required to
create a trad itio n o f taxpayers’ p articipation and voluntary com pliance,
an d to provide the right incentives for efficient levels o f tax effort by local
governm ents.
The Importance o f T ax Revenue Autonomy

T he decentralization theorem (O ates, 1972) states that if the decisions
about the type and am ount o f public goods are allowed to be m ade locally,
then the level o f social w elfare w ould be greater with respect to a situa
tion where public goods are centrally, and uniformly, determ ined for all
localities. T he reason is simply that the local governm ents are better able
to tailor public goods provision to the p articular needs and preferences o f
each jurisdiction.8
In order to adapt the type an d am o u n t o f public goods to local needs
an d preferences, the local authorities require, by necessity, a certain degree
o f autonom y on their expenditure decisions. But even if granted by law,
the expenditure autonom y cannot be practiced w ithout sufficient techni
cal and adm inistrative capacity an d the ability to discretionally increase
the am ount o f local revenues. T he existence o f effective expenditure
an d revenue autonom y is widely recognized in the literature as a basic
requirem ent for realizing the w elfare gains o f fiscal decentralization.
U nfortunately, this econom ic prescription does not always concur, and
might even collide with, the practical drivers o f decentralization. The inter
national m ovem ent tow ards greater fiscal decentralization has responded
m ore to political forces such as the dem and for deeper dem ocratization,
the resolution o f ethnic conflicts, o r the failure o f central governm ents in
securing national objectives, than to a search for greater econom ic effi
ciency as portrayed in the decentralization theorem .9 In m any countries
the im plem entation o f an econom ically efficient decentralization design,
although desirable, m ight well not be a priority.
A ccording to A hm ad and Brosio (2008), one o f the main factors w eak
ening the decentralization process in Latin A m erica has been the lack o f
atten tio n given to the subnational revenue assignm ents. In this context, it
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does not seem too audacious to suggest th at the widespread decentraliza
tion o f the property tax is partially explained by the fact th at the central
authorities have several more efficient, easier to adm inister, and less
unpopular revenue sources under their control. Similarly, central a u th o ri
ties are usually reluctant to devolve effective autonom y to the subnational
governm ents in m ost areas o f taxation. T he reason for this may be the
lack o f technical and adm inistrative capacity at the subnational level, but
it is also reasonable to presum e th at central authorities are not willing to
renounce their pow er over budgetary decisions.
In short, even though the choice o f the property tax as a main source
o f local own revenues seems to be correct from an econom ic perspective,
the assignm ent o f this revenue source to the local governm ents by no
means guarantees th at local governm ents will be able to exert expenditure
autonom y in the m argin and to realize the benefits o f decentralization.

4

EX PL A IN I N G PROPERTY T A X COLLECTIONS:
A N A N A L Y T IC A L FR A M E W O R K

The am ount o f p roperty tax revenues that governm ents are able to collect
varies widely across nations and across jurisdictions w ithin any country,
and depends on a wide range o f institutional, cultural, political and eco
nomic factors. The problem o f property tax collections (or the lack thereof)
has been extensively analyzed in the econom ic literature. The complexities
o f the problem an d d a ta limitations, however, still impose severe restric
tions on the empirical analyses; as a result, no conclusive answers have been
reached about the factors determ ining property tax collections.
In this section we develop a model o f property tax collections, show
their dependency on the concept o f tax effort, and explain how the design
and im plem entation o f the fiscal decentralization process can affect
the perform ance o f the property tax. We begin by presenting a general
model o f revenue collections and then we analyze, separately, the revenue
collection problem at the subnational an d national levels.
A Sim ple Model o f Property Tax Collections

Follow ing Bahl an d M artinez-V azquez (2008), and assum ing that the
property value assessm ent is based o n m arket value, the am ount o f
property tax collections ( T C ) can be defined as:10
t c

= T C 'J ± 'IA V 'T M V
TL

TAV

TMV

MV
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where
TL
TA V
TMV
MV

: property tax liability,
: taxable assessed value,
: taxable m arket value,
: full m arket value.

T he first term on the right-hand side, property tax collections over tax lia
bility, corresponds to the collection ratio. In the ideal case the am ount o f
tax collections should be identical to the tax liabilities and this term would
be equal to one. In practice, however, either the tax authorities might fail
to properly enforce the tax law or the taxpayers m ight fail to com ply with
it; thus the collection ratio is norm ally low er than one. T he value o f the
collection ratio can be interpreted as a m easure o f the observance o f the
tax law an d the ability o f the authorities to enforce it through fines o r even
jail sentences. A ccording to Bahl an d M artinez-V azquez (2008), a norm al
value for the collection ratio in developing countries is around 50 percent,
which is explained as mainly due to lax tax enforcem ent, and in some cases
can even be as low as 20 percent.
T he second term on the right-hand side o f equation (7.1), the share o f tax
liabilities over taxable assessed value, is the statu to ry tax rate, usually set
a t some value lower than 1 percent. The third term represents the assess
m ent ratio, the share o f taxable assessed value on taxable m arket value, by
which the law establishes the share o f the taxable m arket value over which
the tax liability is actually going to be com puted. W hen the assessment
ratio is specified by law, then it norm ally takes a value between zero and
one, but if it is not specified, then its implicit value is one. The assessment
ratio is nothing m ore th an an adjustm ent to the statutory tax rate and it is
used to induce acceptability o f the tax system and reduce com plaints about
the assessm ent criteria, because it gives taxpayers the im pression that they
are not being taxed for the full value o f their p ro p e rty ." Finally, the fourth
and fifth term s on the right-hand side o f equation (7.1) jointly represent
the tax base (TB) th at is actually available for taxation. The fo u rth term is
the ratio o f taxable m arket value over (full) m arket value, and sum m arizes
all the effects o f preferential treatm ents, exem ptions on the tax base, and
errors in assessing the tru e m arket value o f the property (the last term in
the equation). E quation (7.1) can now be rew ritten as:
TC
T C = — • f ■ TB,

(7.2)

where f is the statu to ry tax rate ‘ad ju sted ’ by the assessment ratio.
As explained, the collection ratio m easures the degree o f observance o f
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the tax law, and can be different from one only in the presence o f ‘distor
tions’ im posed by the behavior o f governm ent authorities o r taxpayers.
There are several possible sources o f d istortions that can explain a low
degree o f observance o f the tax law. On the governm ent side, the tax law
can be deficiently enforced (DE) if the tax authorities are either unable
or unwilling to capture the whole revenue potential o f the property tax.
We m ight also be in the presence o f corru p tio n (C), in which case the tax
authorities ap p ro p riate for themselves a share o f the revenues collected.
On th e taxpayers’ side, revenues might be lost due to tax evasion (£ ),
generally defined as any illegal form o f taxpayers' non-com pliance.12 The
traditional model o f tax evasion explains taxpayers' non-com pliance by
considering the probability o f auditing and detection, the cost o f enforce
m ent an d the costs o f non-com pliance, which can be sum m arized under
the concept o f penalties (P ).13 In the case o f the property tax. however,
illegal non-com pliance is limited by the very nature o f the tax base. If
properties are im m ovable, then they can n o t easily be hidden from the
tax authorities. As a result, tax evasion can take place only under certain
circum stances. F o r instance, the taxpayers might take advantage o f the
inability or unwillingness o f the tax authorities to correctly assess the value
o f the property, o r m ight also attem pt to lie in order to qualify for pref
erential treatm ents and exem ptions. In these cases the factor explaining
tax evasion is deficient enforcem ent. Alternatively, co rrupt tax authorities
might accept bribes for reducing taxpayers’ tax bills.
A nother possible form o f tax evasion consists o f simply refusing to pay
the tax liabilities. T his decision would be econom ically rational and even
becom e a com m on practice, if taxpayers perceive that the tax law is not
enforced or if the costs o f tax evasion are relatively low. In contrast, if the
tax law specifies high penalties and is being properly enforced, then tax
evasion would certainly be too costly and eventually lead to the expropria
tion o f the property; thus it is less likely th at the taxpayers would choose
this strategy.
The econom ic literature has recently incorporated the concept o f tax
m orale ( T M ) in order to account for the fact that taxpayers are usually
inclined to voluntarily com ply with the tax law even in the absence o f effec
tive enforcem ent.14 A nalyzing opinion survey data from the United States
and Turkey. T orgler et al. (2008) find that positive attitudes tow ards the
tax authorities and the tax system as well as trust in public officials sig
nificantly increase tax m orale, while the perception o f corruption has the
opposite effect. A dditionally, T orgler (2005a) shows that the willingness to
pay taxes increases with the level o f direct dem ocracy in a jurisdiction. The
evidence provided by the tax m orale literature suggests, therefore, that tax
evasion also depends on the taxpayers' perception ab out the behavior and
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perform ance o f the tax authorities, an d the extent to which they conform
to the preferences o f the com m unity. In our model we sum m arize these
determ inants o f tax m orale with the concepts o f corruption and govern
m ent responsiveness (R ). T ax m orale is expected to decrease (and tax
evasion to increase) with a higher perception o f corruption; the opposite
would occur if the tax authorities are truthfully responsive to the prefer
ences o f the taxpayers.
Sum m arizing, tax evasion can be said to respond positively to deficient
enforcem ent and negatively to the size o f penalties and tax m orale, and
we can write in shorth an d th at E = E [ D E , P, T M ( C , /?)]. Furtherm ore,
the am ount o f tax liabilities (TL) can be decom posed into the observance
o f the tax law, represented by tax collections T C , and the non-observance
o f the tax law, represented by the tax revenues forgone due to deficient
enforcem ent DE, corru p tio n C, and tax evasion E:
TL = T C + D E + C + E[DE, P, T M ( C , R)].

(7.3)

Solving this equation for T C and dividing by TL, we can introduce it into
equation (7.2) to express the am o u n t o f tax collections as:
C

E[ DE, P, T M ( C , R)]
TL

J

f-TB ,

(7.4)

where tax collections ap p ear to be a function o f deficient enforcem ent, cor
ruption, penalties o f tax evasion, governm ent responsiveness, the adjusted
statu to ry tax rate, and the size o f the tax base. T he analytical advantage
o f equation (7.4) is th at now tax collections are exclusively expressed as a
function o f exogenous variables, which allows us to m ore easily identify
the factors that determ ine the actual am o u n t o f tax revenue collections.
The am ount o f taxes a governm ent is able to collect largely depends on
policy variables that can be influenced either by the tax law or by the tax
authorities. This conclusion stresses the role o f the tax laws and the respon
sible governm ent authorities as opposed to the role o f taxpayers in explain
ing tax collections. A governm ent in need o f rising additional revenues is
not limited to legally determ ining the tax rate and the tax base. In reality,
several alternative channels might serve the same purpose. F o r instance,
the tax law might incorporate m easures to minimize and sanction corrup
tion, set adequate levels o f penalties for evasion, and restrict preferential
treatm ents and exem ptions. A lternatively, the tax authorities m ight choose
to effectively enforce the tax law, im prove the assessment process in order
to m ore accurately m easure the tax base, and to deepen the involvement
o f taxpayers in the public spending decisions. As D e Cesare (2002, p. 11)
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points out in the context o f a review of several independent experiences in
Latin Am erica, ‘it [is] clear that the political will is the principal element for
explaining differences in the perform ance o f property taxes’.
So far the discussion about the basic determ inants o f tax collections has
not distinguished betw een the levels o f governm ent responsible for collect
ing the property tax. T his distinction is im portant because different levels
o f governm ent are given different responsibilities and decision-m aking
powers, and also because typically they possess dissimilar levels o f adm in
istrative capacity. In principle, the m ore discretion a subnational govern
ment is allowed, the greater the influence it can exert on the variables
determ ining the am o u n t o f tax collections. In any case, equation (7.4) also
shows th a t even with limited pow er over the design o f the tax policy, a
subnational governm ent has a wide variety o f channels available to alter
the am ount o f tax collections. Indeed, due to their proxim ity to the collec
tion process and to the taxpayers, the subnational authorities could enjoy
some advantages with respect to the central governm ent. C orruption, for
instance, might be easier to detect and correct at the local level; strength
ening the enforcem ent o f the law and reducing tax evasion might well be
facilitated by enhancing the taxpayers' participation in local expenditure
decisions. A lthough n o t conclusive, the econom ic literature provides
some evidence suggesting th at fiscal decentralization reduces the level o f
co rruptio n in a country. W hen authorities enjoy a significant degree o f
autonom y they not only have m ore ability to correct the distortions that
reduce the level o f tax collections, but they also are m ore accountable to
the com m unity.15
Comparing Tax C ollection Performance at the Subnational Level

A subnational governm ent responsible for collecting certain taxes would
likely have some degree o f discretion over several, and m aybe all, o f the
explanatory variables described in equation (7.4). In this context, tax
perform ance can be evaluated by com paring the am ount o f taxes col
lected by different subnational governm ents under sim ilar conditions. A
good (poor) level o f perform ance would consist in collecting a relatively
high (low) am ount o f tax revenues with respect to o ther subnational
governm ents that face a com parable tax base and enjoy a similar level o f
discretion.
The natural question is w hat am ount o f tax collections should be
considered as the benchm ark to distinguish between good and poor per
form ance. In principle, for each level o f governm ent, the total am ount
o f revenues raised should be able to cover all the expenditure needs.
T herefore, in a decentralized system o f governm ent the benchm arking
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am ount o f tax collections can be defined, jointly for all tax instrum ents
available, as the share o f expenditure needs that remain unfunded after
the vertical im balance has been corrected via intergovernm ental transfers.
U nfortunately, this benchm ark requires a precise m easure o f the vertical
im balance, which in practice is difficult to obtain. A more feasible alterna
tive is to set the benchm ark at the average effective tax rate, te, such that
any governm ent whose effective tax rate is higher (lower) than the average
would be said to exert a relatively high (low) ‘statu to ry ’ tax effo rt.16
Now we can m ultiply both the n u m erato r and the denom inator o f the
right-hand side of equation (7.4) by f , and rewrite the equation to describe
the tax collections o f any ju risdiction i as:
f
C,
DE,
E,[DE,,P, TM,(C„ /?,)]! /? TC, - { 1 - - = r - - = r - — —
’
'
} = • f ■TBt. (7.5)
'
I
TL,
TL,
TL,
) r
N ote that P and r are the only variables not determ ined inside the ju ris
diction. In general, the tax law assigns different responsibilities to the
different levels o f governm ent, an d au th o rity over variables such as the
penalties o f tax evasion m ight be reserved to the central governm ent or
even be an exclusive prerogative o f the congress. Because o f this, the pen
alties o f tax evasion as well as any policy variables that are n o t under the
au th o rity o f subnational governm ents can be considered to be determ ined
exogenously.
O n the right-hand side o f eq u atio n (7.5), the product o f the term s inside
the bracket an d the ratio o f adjusted statu to ry tax rate over the average
(benchm ark) effective tax rate represents a ‘relative effective tax rate’,
which takes a value greater than, equal to o r lower than one as long as
the tax rate effectively applied on the governm ent unit / is greater than,
equal to or lower than the sam ple average. This is precisely the definition
o f w hat the econom ic literature refers to as the tax effort ( TE ) exerted by a
particular governm ent. M oreover, the product o f the last tw o term s in the
equation, the average (benchm ark) effective tax rate times the tax base o f
the governm ent unit /, describes the concept o f fiscal capacity (EC), which
is usually defined as the am o u n t o f tax revenues th at could be collected if a
given level o f effort were applied to the available tax base. E quation (7.5)
can therefore be reduced to the following identity:
TC, = TE, ■FC,y

(7.6)

where the taxes collected by a governm ent i are defined as the am ount
o f revenues obtained by applying the level o f effort exerted by that
governm ent to a ‘fair’ m easure o f its potential tax revenues.
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By expressing th e am ount o f tax collections as a function o f the level o f
tax effort, equation (7.6) stresses the fact th at, given the size o f the avail
able tax base, and a certain degree o f fiscal autonom y, each subnational
governm ent is largely responsible for the am ount o f taxes actually col
lected within its jurisdiction. In this sense, tax effort is a choice variable
that can be altered by voluntary decisions o f subnational authorities and
those o f taxpayers, and therefore it can be used as a m easure o f tax col
lection perform ance. E quation (7.6) implies that we can estim ate the tax
effort o f a subnational governm ent as the ratio o f its actual tax collections
over its fiscal capacity:
TC.
TE; = — 7.
EC,

(7.7)

In order to evaluate the perform ance o f each subnational governm ent
we only need to com pare its tax effort with the tax effort o f the other
subnational governm ents o f the same level. M oreover, since data about
subnational revenue collections are usually available for m ost countries,
the m ain challenge lies in estim ating fiscal capacity.
A correct interpretation o f the concept o f tax effort requires a careful
consideration o f the actual degree o f fiscal autonom y enjoyed in each
jurisdiction. If all subnational governm ents enjoy the same degree o f
(significant) fiscal auto n o m y , then a relatively high (low) level o f fiscal
effort might simply suggest that the ju risdiction’s residents are dem anding
a relatively large (sm all) am ount o f subnational services. Given that the
efficiency gains o f fiscal decentralization arise from tailoring the provision
o f public services to the needs and preferences o f each com m unity, then
even a very low level o f tax effort could be regarded as optim al. Indeed,
if the system o f intergovernm ental fiscal relations is properly functioning
then there would be nothing right (wrong) with a high (low) level o f tax
effort, and no rew ard (penalty) would be justified. In practice, however,
and especially in th e initial states o f a fiscal decentralization reform, sub
national fiscal au to n o m y might be limited by several factors. For instance,
there might not be a longstanding trad itio n o f taxpayers' contributions
to the public sector, an d thus taxpayers might not be willing to volun
tarily com ply with the law and nor would the tax authorities be willing
to enforce it. D ecentralization reform , in this sense, can actually imply
a radical cultural change for some com m unities. A nother lim itation,
very com m on am ong poor jurisdictions, is that o f the lack of technical
and adm inistrative capacity to m anage subnational finances and collect
the taxes. A sub n atio n al governm ent cannot be expected to assess the
tax base, com pute the tax liability and collect the taxes w ithout proper
m eans to carry out these functions. But this basic contradiction is a rather
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com m on occurrence am ong subnational governm ents in L atin America,
especially in the rural areas. In o rd er to address this problem either an
asym m etric decentralization o f public functions or central governm ent
assistance to develop ad eq u ate capacity would be required.
Given th at the factors lim iting subnational fiscal autonom y usually
affect different jurisdictions unevenly, the observed variations in tax effort
and perform ance may no longer be the result o f subnational choices. It
follows th at in order to m ake the subnational authorities (and the com 
munities) fully liable for the differences in tax effort then they should enjoy
equal, or at least com parable, levels o f effective fiscal autonom y.
In spite o f this argum ent, in o rd er to increase own-revenue collections,
som e countries decide to rew ard high tax effort with additional intergov
ernm ental transfers, and sanction low tax effort with no additional, or
fewer, intergovernm ental transfers. These incentives might serve as an
effective to o l to encourage greater subnational tax collections, but it is
im portant to recognize th at they w ould plausibly lead to counterproduc
tive results. T he reason for this is very simple and deals with the trade-off
faced at the subnational level between ow n-revenue sources and intergov
ernm ental transfers. A ssum ing th a t there are no savings, the to ta l am ount
o f governm ent expenditures in public services (G) is equal to own-tax
collections plus the am o u n t received in the form o f intergovernm ental
transfers ( T ),17 thus for any subnational governm ent i we can write the
budget co n strain t as:
G, = TC, + T„

(7.8)

from which it is clear th at subnational expenditures can be expressed as a
function o f intergovernm ental transfers, G, = G,[T)]. Replacing T Q b y its
definition in equation (7.6), dividing by fiscal capacity FCt and solving for
the level o f tax effort TE„ we find that:
G ,[T] - T
TE, = - — FC

(7.9)

such that the tax effort exerted by the subnational governm ent / is equal
to the difference between the to tal am o u n t o f public expenditures and the
intergovernm ental transfers received, over the fiscal capacity o f the juris
diction. In o th er words, tax effort corresponds to the extent to which a
subnational governm ent exhausts its own tax base.
A ccording to equation (7.9) the direct effect o f intergovernm ental
transfers, w ith a negative sign, is to reduce tax effort. An additional effect,
however, can be observed in the am o u n t o f public goods a n d services
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provided. C onsidering fiscal capacity as exogenous, the net effect o f tran s
fers on tax effort will depend on w hether public expenditures will increase
in a greater, equal or lower proportion than the transfers received. As a
consequence, the final effect o f intergovernm ental transfers on tax effort
will ultim ately depend on the elasticity o f public goods provision with
respect to a m arginal increase o f the subnational budget. Jurisdictions
where public goods are elastic will respond to additional intergovernm en
tal transfers by increasing the level o f tax effort, but those where public
goods are inelastic, or com paratively less desirable, will reduce their
tax effo rt.18 This im plies that, regardless o f the level o f fiscal autonom y
o f subnational governm ents, tax effort can certainly be affected by
intergovernm ental transfers.
This analysis m ight suggest th at the final effect o f intergovernm ental
transfers on tax effort is efficient in the sense th at it responds to the dem and
o f public services w ithin each jurisdiction. However, this conclusion is not
necessarily correct. T he dem and for public services is affected by prefer
ences an d also by the quality o f public services, and in turn this quality can
be expected to vary across jurisdictions.19 Some local governm ents might
not be able to provide public services with desirable standards o f quality,
which w ould reduce their dem and and the resultant level o f tax effort. The
obvious equity problem s that arise will have to be solved in accordance
with the national preferences for redistribution.
Estim ating Fiscal C apacity o f Subnational Governments

F o r the most part, the empirical literature on the property tax has focused
on m easuring tax effort at the subnational level by considering fiscal
capacity as an exogenous factor with respect to the tax revenue perform 
ance o f subnational units. The reason for this is th at any exercise of
discretion implies a certain degree o f responsibility and thus allows us to
evaluate tax perform ance on the basis o f effective power over tax collec
tions. In this sense, subnational governm ents are by presum ption passive
with respect to their fiscal capacity and this concept can be regarded as
irrelevant for perform ance evaluations.
In the previous discussion we showed, however, th at a good m easure
o f fiscal capacity is critical to accurately estim ate the tax effort and evalu
ate their tax perform ance. M easuring the fiscal capacity with respect to
the property tax is particularly difficult because o f the great financial,
technical and adm inistrative requirem ents for developing com prehensive
cadastres o f im m ovable properties. Any m easure other than the cadas
tre, and independent from the actual value o f properties, will provide a
questionable estim ation o f the potential property tax base.
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U nfortunately, developing countries struggle with the com plexity and
costs associated with the construction o f the cadastre, but still the prospect
o f not taxing properties seems to be a m uch worse solution. In practice,
the use o f indirect m ethodologies for estim ating the fiscal capacity associ
ated with the property tax can help to partially solve this problem . The
literature has described a num ber o f these m ethodologies, which have been
designed to do as much as the availability o f inform ation allows.
One o f the simplest m ethodologies consists o f using historical p ro p 
erty tax collections from one or several past periods. This m ethodology
assum es th at past collections can be representative o f the fiscal capacity
o f local governm ents. H ow ever, there are several factors th at m ight create
a difference between potential and actual tax collections. T he presence o f
centrally im posed exem ptions eroding the tax base, o r greater adm inistra
tive and com pliance costs, and the taxpayers’ willingness to contribute to
the provision o f public goods, are some examples o f factors th at might
truly reduce fiscal disparities. But historically low tax collections might
also be caused by inefficiency, political favors and co rruption. In this
context, it is desirable to have som e inform ation about the determ inants
o f fiscal capacity. F o r instance, we m ight expect that m easures o f income,
production or consum ption could be related to the size o f the tax base,
including the property tax base. In general, the use o f this type o f ‘proxies’
is preferable to the use o f historical d ata, but in developing countries we
can rarely co u n t on this inform ation at the local level.
There are several additional m ethodologies for estim ating fiscal capac
ity and their usefulness, o f course, depends on w hether the d a ta are avail
able or n o t.20 In any case, it is im p o rtan t to stress the fact th a t deficient
measures o f fiscal capacity lead, necessarily, to equally deficient estim ates
o f tax effort.
Comparing T ax Collection Performance across Countries

The com parison of property tax perform ance across countries follows the
sam e logic as the com parison o f subnational tax perform ance. M aybe the
m ost im p o rtan t difference consists o f which institutions are ultimately
responsible for the relative variations in tax perform ance. In the analysis
o f subnational tax collections, subnational governm ents are responsible
for their perform ance up to the point where they do not have further dis
cretion to affect tax collections. Such a limit is imposed, for instance, by the
tax law, which can usually be regarded as exogenous for any subnational
governm ent and even for the central governm ent. In contrast, regardless
o f which level o f governm ent is responsible for adm inistering a tax source,
at the co u n try level the tax law and the public policies in general should
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be considered as endogenous and other national institutions such as the
congress an d the ju d iciary system also becom e responsible for the result
ant level o f national tax perform ance.
In this cross-country context, m ost o f the variables determ ining pro p 
erty tax collections can be considered to be endogenous, and we can define
the total am ount o f tax collections for any country j as:
f
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where besides the change in subscripts the only difference with respect to
the subnational case is that the penalties for tax evasion (as well as any
other determ inant th a t might be exogenously imposed by the tax law) are
expressed as endogenous (choice) v ariab les.21
M oreover, given that a country has full discretion to define the tax base,
and provided that the m arket value o f all land and structures ( Vt) is avail
able for taxation in the national territory, then the share o f the actual tax
base over Vj becom es by itself a com ponent o f the national tax effort. As a
consequence, the co u n try has discretion over all the variables in the righthand side o f the equ atio n , and tax effort can be defined simply as:
TC,
TEj —

(7.11)
j

This equation states th a t national tax effort can be estim ated as the ratio
between actual tax collections and the m arket value o f lands and structures
available for taxation within a country, while the last term determ ines the
potential tax collections or fiscal capacity o f the country. In turn, cross
country com parisons can be carried out by simply com paring the values
o f national tax effort.
O f course, as in the case o f subnational tax perform ance, the main chal
lenge with estim ating national tax effort is m easuring the fiscal capacity o f
the country. If this is possible, however, the cross-country analysis o f tax
effort and perform ance offers im portant advantages in terms o f d ata avail
ability, because m uch m ore d ata about institutional, political, cultural and
econom ic variables are available at the country level.
G iven that each country defines its own property tax base and might
use different valuation m ethods to estim ate the tax base, a wide variation
o f financial and technical arrangem ents can be observed am ong different
countries. As a consequence, even if available, national estim ates o f the
property tax base are not com parable. Bahl and W allace (2010) suggest
a standardized ap p ro ach in order to solve this problem: The measures o f
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national w ealth provided by the W orld Bank (2006) can be used to esti
m ate the size o f the potential prop erty tax base under a single criterion
and for a large num ber o f countries. In A ppendix Table 7A.2 we present
the estim ates o f the potential pro p erty tax bases for a num ber o f Latin
A m erican countries. U n fortunately, the measures o f national wealth are
currently available only for the year 2000; thus even if useful, they do not
provide inform ation ab o u t how tax bases vary across time. In the next
section we use these estim ates in the econom etric analysis o f international
property tax perform ance.

5

THE D E T E R M I N A N T S OF PROPERTY TA X
COLLECTIONS IN LATIN A M E R IC A

An em pirical test o f the m ain p ropositions o f our analysis requires infor
m ation th at, in general, is not available at the subnational level in Latin
A m erican countries, so we are not able to properly account for the deter
m inants o f property tax collections at the w ithin-country level. F or this
reason, we begin with a simple O LS regression analysis in order to verify
how intergovernm ental transfers received by local governm ents in Brazil
and Peru (in national currency) are correlated with per capita property tax
collections.22
The results are presented in T able 7.4. Because o f data availability,
we are able to include only a few o th er control variables to get a clearer
picture o f the potential im pact o f intergovernm ental transfers on property
tax collections. These control variables are the total am ount o f current
revenues in each jurisdiction, revenue au tonom y (defined as own taxes
over total revenues), populatio n , regional G D P in the case o f Brazil, and
the relative incidence o f poverty and the percent o f urban population in
the case o f Peru. We should also note that total cu rren t revenues and
revenue au tonom y should be expected to be endogenous with property
tax collections; however, lacking valid instrum ents we cannot correct this
problem . Nevertheless, a few interesting observations m ay be draw n from
the results.
The m ost relevant result in T able 7.4 is that current intergovernm ental
transfers per capita are negatively an d significantly correlated with pro p 
erty tax collections per cap ita in the tw o countries. This would seem to
suggest th at on average curren t transfers act as a disincentive for property
tax collections. However, we need to interpret this result w ith caution.
T here m ay be an endogeneity bias in these estim ates because lower p ro p 
erty tax revenues per capita m ay also induce larger current intergovern
m ental transfers per capita. O n the o th er hand, the coefficients o f capital
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Determinants o f property tax collections in Brazil and Peru
( dependent variable: per capita property tax collections)
OLS regression: Brazil

OLS regression: Peru

-0.1124***
(0.0237)
0.0058
(0.0063)
0.1081***
(0.0223)
2.5051***
(64.9611)
-0.0006**
(0.0003)

-0.2263***
(0.0130)
-0 .0 0 8 0
(0.0191)
0.2165***
(0.0123)
1.6772***
(49.8014)

Current transfers per capita
Capital transfers per capita
Current revenues per capita
Revenue autonomy (%)
Per capita G D P (2000)
Poverty
Urban population (%)
Population (thousands)

-0 .0 0 1 5
(0.0047)
-8.7593***
(3.3112)

Constant
Observations
^-squared

4,998
0.5218

0.0097
(0.0427)
-0.1065***
(0.0390)
-0.1159***
(0.0439)
6.6278
(4.0486)
1.428
0.8769

Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

intergovernm ental transfers are not statistically significant, suggesting
th at the distribution o f this revenue source because o f its unpredictability
or periodicity does not affect local property tax collection perform ance.
T he coefficients o f total current revenues and revenue autonom y are
positive and statistically significant. But these results are expected due to
the construction o f those variables; by definition the larger the property
tax collections the larger will be the am ount o f current revenues as well as
the share o f own revenues in the local budgets. However, they might also
suggest, subject again to a possible endogeneity bias, that local govern
m ents w ith larger budgets and m ore revenue autonom y might be better
able to collect pro p erty taxes.
T he regressions also include proxies for local fiscal capacity, which help
to estim ate the relative size o f the property tax base as well as the adm in
istrative capacity o f local governm ents. T he per capita G D P variable is
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available for Brazilian local governm ents. Its coefficient is negative and
significant at the 5 percent confidence level. This result is contrary to our
expectations, as long as G D P per capita is expected to be highly correlated
with the p roperty tax base; but it could also be that a higher G D P per
capita signals the availability o f o th er tax bases, such as Brazil’s ISS (local
tax on services), which is relatively m ore im p ortant than the property tax
in local budgets. The availability o f o th er tax sources may push down
local efforts to collect the m ore difficult and u n p opular property tax.23
However, we m ust note th at the estim ated coefficient is relatively unim 
p o rtan t in term s o f m agnitude, im plying that property tax collections are
not that responsive to this factor. In the case o f Peru there are no measures
o f G D P at the local level. Instead, we use a m easure o f poverty defined as
the share o f the population under the poverty line; this variable displays
no significant correlation with pro p erty taxes. In addition, we consider
the share o f the population living in urban areas, which is expected to be
directly related with the size o f the p roperty tax base; however, here again
the coefficient is instead negative an d statistically significant, perhaps sign
aling the availability o f oth er m ore ‘convenient’ revenue sources in urban
areas.
Finally, the regressions also include population as a co n tro l for the
jurisdiction size. In both cases the coefficient is negative, b u t it is sig
nificant only for Peruvian m unicipalities. T his is som ew hat surprising
because we w ould expect to observe econom ies o f scale in property tax
collections. However, this result m ight be explained, for instance, by the
presence o f econom ies o f scale on the expenditure side; or, alternatively,
by a positive correlation between the extent o f inform al properties and the
jurisdictional size.
The em pirical analysis o f pro p erty tax collections at the local level is still
subject to very im p o rtan t d ata lim itations, and the inability to properly
control for other d eterm inants can easily lead to significant om itted vari
able bias. In contrast, even though at the international level the data are
also limited, there are several ad d itio n al variables that allow us to control
for m acroeconom ic, political a n d institutional factors th at are relevant in
determ ining property tax collections. In the end, however, there is a clear
trade-off since using international cross-country data is also subject to
aggregation biases and om itted cou n try fixed effects.
The cross-country analysis o f the d eterm inants o f property tax collec
tions considers nine L atin A m erican countries for which relevant data are
partially available for the 1990-2007 period: A rgentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, C olom bia. E cuador, M exico, Paraguay, and Peru. T he dependent
variable, property tax collections, is defined as the share o f property tax
collections in G D P . Based on the discussion in the previous section, we
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expect property tax collections to decrease with deficient enforcem ent,
corruption, tax evasion and the predom inance o f transfers, and to increase
with the size o f the pro p erty tax base, governm ent responsiveness, and the
average tax rate. Even though there are direct m easures o f all these vari
ables, som e of them are not available for long periods o f time for all Latin
A m erican countries. In order to maximize the num ber o f observations,
we use alternative (m ore com m on) variables as proxies o f our variables o f
interest.
We consider a variety o f factors accounting for the design o f fiscal
arrangem ents, the level o f developm ent, the size o f the property tax base,
relevant differences in the im plem entation o f the property tax, and basic
characteristics o f the political system.24 T he structure o f fiscal arrange
ments is described through measures o f fiscal decentralization, the level o f
transfer dependency, an d the size o f governm ent. Fiscal decentralization
is defined as the share o f subnational expenditures over total governm ent
expenditures, and it is used to represent the extent o f the fiscal devolution
to the subnational governm ents.25 The dependency on transfers is defined
as the share o f intergovernm ental transfers in total subnational revenues.
As explained, intergovernm ental transfers reduce the need for collecting
own revenues and, therefore, might reduce tax effort and the collections
of the property tax. Finally, governm ent size is used to account for the
relative m agnitude an d relevancy o f the public sector and its com ponents,
including transfer program s, in the overall economy.
The level o f developm ent is represented by the per capita G D P. This
variable provides inform ation, am ong other things, on the levels o f accu
m ulated physical and hum an capital. F o r example, local governm ents in
richer countries m ight have access to highly skilled personnel and m ore
sophisticated equipm ent, so that their ability to adm inister and collect
taxes is greater than th a t o f less-developed countries. However, different
levels o f developm ent can also be related to diverse p atterns o f subnational
governm ents’ financing, and thus the sign o f the influence on property tax
collections rem ains uncertain.
Property tax collections also depend on the value o f land and struc
tures in a country, which accounts for the potential property tax base.
We approxim ate this value, following Bahl and W allace (2010), with
estim ations com puted on the basis o f national wealth d a ta provided by
the W orld Bank (2006) (see Appendix T able 7A.2). We also control for
the share o f the u rb an population, because the size and com position o f the
tax base as well as the am o u n t o f property tax collections can be expected
to be quite different in rural and urban areas. In addition, we include two
dum m y variables to con tro l for the specific characteristics o f Chile, where
the adm inistration and the au thority over the property tax remain fully
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centralized, and o f E cuador and M exico, the only countries in the sample
where the cadastre is developed by the subnational governm ents (see
A ppendix T able 7A.1).
In practice, subnational governm ents can effectively enjoy additional
fiscal au tonom y only if the decentralization process also enhances the
political representation o f the population. Indeed, the share o f local gov
ernm ent expenditure over total governm ent expenditures does not say
m uch ab o u t the ability o f taxpayers to choose their representatives and
express their preferences for public goods, which, in turn, determ ines the
extent o f effective accountability o f governm ent officials and the degree
o f responsiveness to taxpayers’ preferences. In order to account for these
factors we consider two variables: the com petition for public positions and
an index o f dem ocracy. The degree o f com petition for public positions,
we argue, serves to limit the ability o f local authorities to take advantage
o f their political power, and thus helps to increase accountability and to
contain co rruption. C om plem entarily, the index o f dem ocracy serves to
represent the ability o f taxpayers to truly express their preferences.
Table 7.5 presents the results o f o u r em pirical analysis. The first regres
sion (1) uses a fixed effects model in o rd er to control in the estim ation for
all unobserved specific-country characteristics. As we m ight expect, the
coefficient o f fiscal decentralization is positive and statistically significant
at the 1 percent level. A greater devolution o f expenditure responsibilities
to subnational governm ents requires relatively m ore revenues, provid
ing incentives for greater property tax collections. T he coefficient for
the dependency on transfers takes a negative sign, and thus is negatively
related to property tax collections, an d it is statistically significant a t the
5 percent level. This result is im portant because it supports our conjecture
that the predom inance o f transfers can have a negative effect on tax effort.
In order to control for the relative m agnitude o f intergovernm ental tran s
fers we also include an interaction term between transfers and the size of
the (general) governm ent w ith respect to the G D P. The coefficient o f this
variable is positive and significant, suggesting that the negative effect o f
transfers o f property tax collections is reduced as the size o f the govern
ment increases. A bigger public sector might need to count on other (than
property) tax sources, and m ight also be better able to im prove tax adm in
istration at every level an d to im plem ent ‘non-distorting’ o r ‘incentiven eu tral’ transfer program s. O n average, the net effect o f transfers on
property tax collections becom es positive when the size o f the public sector
corresponds to 17.7 percent o f the econom y (displayed at the bottom o f
Table 7.5).
The level o f developm ent, represented by the G D P per capita, has a neg
ative effect on property tax collections, which is significant at the 1 percent

Table 7.5

Determinants o f property ta x collections ( dependent variable: property tax collections ( P T C ) as a share o f
GDP)
Fixed effects

Fiscal decentralization (%)
Dependency on transfers (%)
Interaction term (dep. on transfers x
government size)
Government size (% G D P)
Log o f per capita G D P

(1)

Random effects
(2)

0.00919***
(0.00242)
-0.01047**
(0.00509)
0.00059**
(0.00028)
-0.01288
(0.01554)
-0.17295***
(0.04730)

0.01617***
(0.00150)
-0.01053***
(0.00234)
0.00072***
(0.00014)
-0.02731***
(0.00901)
-0.28330***
(0.05883)

Log o f per capita G D P squared
Log o f estimated property tax base
(as computed in Appendix Table 7A.2)
Urban population (%)

0.00438
(0.00743)

Municipal cadastre (dummy)
Chile (dummy)
Competition for public positions

0.09501***
(0.02422)

0.27237***
(0.02755)
-0.01564***
(0.00280)
-0.35632***
(0.02223)
0.85010***
(0.05660)
0.12712***
(0.02600)

Random effects
(3)
0.01445***
(0.00135)
-0.00502**
(0.00255)
0.00043***
(0 00015)
-0.00776
(0.00952)
-2.65021***
(0.84908)
0.12901***
(0.04562)
0.26629***
(0.02683)
-0.01050***
(0.00326)
-0.36153***
(0.02096)
0.83174***
(0.05267)
0.12667***
(0.02439)

Random effects I
(4)
0.03038***
(0.00637)
-0.02031***
(0.00697)
0.00086***
(0.00029)
-0.04679**
(0.01991)
0.10259
(0.11616)

0.40590***
(0.08117)
-0.04710***
(0.01429)
-0.33473***
(0.05178)
1.17456***
(0.16223)
0.14642***
(0.04218)

T a b le 7.5

(c o n tin u e d )
Fixed effects

Index o f democracy
Constant
Observations
Number o f countries
/?-squared within
/f-squared between
/^-squared overall
Test o f overidentifying restrictions
p -value
The mg. effect o f G D P on PTC turns positive
when G D P per capita is:
The mg. effect o f transfers on PTC turns
positive when government size is:

(1)

Random effects
(2)

-0.03259***
(0.00727)
1.68607***
(0.63587)

-0.05281***
(0.00804)
3.53144***
(0.45747)

115
9
0.5913
0.1392
0.1288

115
9
0.4667
0.9795
0.9332

Random effects
(3)
-0.05330***
(0.00702)
13.66880***
(3.72743)
115
9
0.4487
0.9921
0.9396

Random effects IVa
(4)
0.08504***
(0.01904)
4.51384***
(0.74078)
115
9
0.1603
0.9252
0.8367
0.233
0.6294

28,892
17.7

14.6

11.7

23.6

Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include time period dummies (not shown)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
a The instrumented variables are fiscal decentralization, dependency on transfers, and the interaction term between the later and government size.
The instruments are log o f population, political com petition, openness to international trade and the price level o f government expenditures.
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level. T his result m ight appear as counterintuitive, because a greater level
o f developm ent is usually associated not only with im proved tax bases and
adm inistrative and tax collection capacity, but also with greater ability
(and m aybe willingness) to pay property taxes. An alternative explanation
o f this result would go along the same lines discussed above for the case
o f Brazil; higher G D P per capita m ay signal the availability o f other tax
sources o f some significance and therefore a relative decrease in the reli
ance on property taxes as a source o f local revenue. A simple analysis o f
the subnational tax mix and G D P per capita would seem to point in that
direction; Figure 7.1(a) plots property tax collections as a share of subna
tional taxes against G D P per capita. T here appears to be a clear negative
relationship between these variables, suggesting that the relative im por
tance o f the property in subnational governm ents’ financing decreases as
the country G D P per capita increases.26
Finally, am ong the oth er controls only com petition for public posi
tions and the index o f dem ocracy are statistically significant. As expected,
the variable used to represent accountability and the limits to corruption
- com petition for public positions, is positively related to property tax
collections. In contrast, the coefficient o f the index o f dem ocracy has a
negative sign, suggesting that the p roperty tax might n o t enjoy political
acceptability.27
The second colum n o f Table 7.5 presents the results o f a random effects
model in which we are able to include tim e-constant variables, at the same
time partially controlling for country-specific effects. The results under
this specification are fairly consistent with the findings under fixed effects,
but all controls are now significant at the 1 percent level. In particular,
governm ent size and the percentage o f urb an population appear to be
negatively correlated w ith property tax collections.
The tim e-invariant variables th at are included in this estim ation are
(the logarithm of) the estim ated size o f the potential tax base, a dum m y
that takes the value o f one for Chile, and a dum m y th at assigns a value o f
one to the two countries o f the sample in which the cadastre is developed
locally, E cuador and M exico. The signs o f the coefficients o f the timeconstant variables are in line with o u r expectations. T he greater the size
o f the potential tax base the greater the relative am ount o f property tax
collections.28 On the o th er hand, E cuador an d Mexico app ear as collecting
fewer taxes due to the reliance on, presum ably ill-equipped, subnational
tax adm inistration; C hile perform s better than the average o f the sample
due to the opposite reason.
Regression (3) in T able 7.5 introduces the square o f the G D P per capita
in order to allow for a non-linear influence on property tax collections.
The general results do n o t significantly differ from the previous regression.
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Figure 7.1

Relationship o f property ta x collections with GDP per capita
and corruption
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and the square o f the G D P per capita is positive and statistically signifi
cant at the 1 percent level; implying th at the negative m arginal effect o f
developm ent on property tax collection decreases with per capita G D P .29
A relevant concern a b o u t the econom etric specification is the existence
o f an endogenous relationship between some o f the explanatory variables
and property tax collections. In particular we may expect a certain degree
o f reverse causality; th a t is, we can expect the extent o f fiscal decentraliza
tion and the am ount o f transfers to be influenced by the level o f property
tax collections. In o rd er to address this problem , in regression (4) we use
a generalized tw o-stage least squares (G 2SLS) random effects model,
where we introduce instrum ental variables (IV) to correct possible biases
in the estim ators. T he instrum ented variables are fiscal decentralization,
dependency on transfers, and the interaction term between dependency
on transfers and the size o f governm ent. As instrum ents we choose the
log o f population, the degree o f political (party) com petition, openness
to international trade an d the price level o f governm ent expenditures.10
The set o f instrum ents is highly correlated w ith the three endogenous vari
ables but uncorrelated with property tax collections. M oreover, the test
o f overidentifying restrictions (in the table) fails to reject the null that the
set o f excluded variables are valid instruments.-11 In general, although the
m agnitude o f the coefficients exhibit relevant corrections, their signs and
statistical significance rem ain roughly unaffected.52
Sum m arizing, p ro p erty tax revenue perform ance im proves with the
extent o f fiscal decentralization, the presence o f accountability m echa
nisms, and the size o f the potential tax base. In contrast, tax collections
decrease with the index o f dem ocracy, higher dependency on transfers,
and the fact that the cadastre is adm inistered locally.
Finally, a variable th a t we have considered as a potentially im portant
determ inant o f prop erty tax collections is the perception o f corruption,
which even if available, has been excluded from the econom etric analysis
due to the small num ber o f observations. Figure 7.1(b) presents a scatter
plot where we verify an apparent correlation between property tax col
lections as a share o f G D P and the C o rru p tio n Perceptions Index. The
C orruptio n Perceptions Index assigns a greater value to those countries
that are less corrupt, thus the positively sloped trend line suggests that less
corrupt countries are, o n average, able to collect m ore property taxes.33
T his analysis p rovides im p o rtan t insights ab o u t the d eterm inants o f
pro p erty tax collections in Latin A m erica. In principle, given th at we
do n o t have in fo rm atio n ab o u t w hat the 'co rrect' level o f property tax
collections is, we c a n n o t say a priori w hether increasing tax collections
is a desirable thing. H ow ever, it is well know n th at L atin A m erican
countries perform below international stan d ard s, an d since we have no
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reason to presum e th at their su b n atio n al expenditure needs are p a r
ticularly low, then we can conclude th at certain factors have an exces
sively (undesirable) negative influence on p ro p erty tax collections. The
dependency on transfers an d local responsibility fo r the im plem entation
o f the cadastre are tw o relevant factors in reducing property tax collec
tions and over which the au th o ritie s m ight have som e degree o f control.
F o r instance, the design o f the fiscal decentralization might in co rp o rate
new su b n atio n al ow n-revenue sources, such th a t the local au th o rities
and their constituencies internalize the value o f revenue a u to n o m y and
sta rt exercising higher tax effort in o rd er to finance expanded local
services. N evertheless, g reater au to n o m y at the local level does not
m ean th a t com plex, long-lasting an d expensive tasks such as building
a com plete cadastre o f p ro p erties can be u n dertak en w ithout assistance
from the central governm ent. T he m ovem ent tow ards g reater revenue
collections an d au to n o m y , especially in developing countries, m ust be
g radual, w ith a central g overnm ent th a t is able to support a n d assist
local ad m in istratio n s in their tra n sitio n to m ore decentralized and
efficient arran g em en ts.

6

C O N C L U S I O N S A N D POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS

Successful decentralization in term s o f efficiency and fiscal responsibil
ity depends critically on the provision o f adequate revenue autonom y to
subnational governm ents. The property tax is widely considered as the
m ost ap p ro p riate instrum ent to prom ote tax autonom y a t the local level,
while other taxes such as vehicle taxes, local excise, piggyback personal
incom e taxes, o r business perm it taxes should also play an im portant role
in the pro m o tio n o f local tax autonom y. However, it is difficult to argue
strongly for greater p roperty tax au tonom y when m any local governm ents
in Latin A m erica appear not to be taking advantage o f the autonom y
that is currently granted in the laws. An im portant piece o f any potential
indictm ent is that, judging from w hat is collected in other regions o f the
w orld, actual p roperty tax collections in the region are a small fraction o f
w hat appears to be the revenue potential. In this context, any attem pts
to achieve m ore efficient form s o f decentralization in the Latin American
region via increased revenue au to n o m y for local governm ents w ould need
to grapple w ith the question o f how to achieve significant im provem ent in
local property tax collections.
P roperty tax collections are determ ined by a wide array o f factors. These
factors include, am ong others, the extent o r depth o f fiscal decentralization
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reforms, the structure o f subnational financing, the level o f developm ent,
the potential size o f the property tax base, an d basic institutional charac
teristics o f the public sector. In particular, we find that the predom inance
o f intergovernm ental transfers in the subnational finance systems have
a negative effect o n property tax collections and that, for the most part,
subnational governm ents are unwilling or do not seem capable o f taking
advantage o f the devolution o f this revenue source. In this context, getting
the property tax to perform correctly may take m ore than just addressing
the issues, complex on their own, o f designing, adm inistering and enforc
ing the property tax itself. For instance, we argue th at governm ent respon
siveness tow ards taxp ay ers’ needs and im provem ents in cultural factors
such as tax m orale m ight be necessary to increase property tax collections.
Effective devolution o f the property tax to subnational governm ents
should be accom panied by certain preconditions. Some o f these precondi
tions are not currently met by some Latin A m erican countries, and thus
provide a good starting point to draw m eaningful policy recom m enda
tions to guide future reform s. O f course, country circum stances and con
ditions differ, so n o t all recom m endations should be expected to apply to
each case.
T here is a clear need for m ost local governm ents to develop their adm in
istrative and technical capacities. This rath er obvious recom m endation
has long been recognized in the literature, but it rem ains as an unavoidable
and pending task. T w o possible strategies to move forw ard in this regard
are the im plem entation o f asymm etric property tax assignm ents and the
provision o f technical and financial assistance to those local governm ents
with lower adm inistrative capacity. M oreover, im proving the perform ance
o f the property tax in the region would also benefit from strengthening
institutions and reshaping cultural attitudes. In particular, it is necessary
to m ake local authorities understand the im portance o f ow n-tax revenues
and to show taxpayers the connection between property tax paym ents
and local services. T his will not be an easy task, but successful experiences
such as those provided by the cities o f B ogota and Lima might serve as
relevant examples (see M artinez-V azquez, 2010). Finally, some reform s to
the intergovernm ental finance system m ay be necessary. It is particularly
im portan t to correct the incentives provided by the system o f transfers.
In this chapter we provide some evidence o f a potential negative effect o f
intergovernm ental transfers on property tax collections. These issues still
need to be carefully investigated.
O verall, and som ew hat paradoxically, greater revenue autonom y for
Latin A m erican local governm ents in the form o f a m ore effective use o f
the property tax m ight depend in some cases on a deeper involvement o f
the central governm ent in the adm inistration, collection and enforcem ent
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o f the p roperty tax. M aking property taxes work m ore effectively will
continue to be a complex challenge and no simple ‘silver bullet’ simple
solutions are in sight. A ttention m ust be given to ‘internal’ factors, includ
ing issues o f adm inistration and local capacity, but equal attention must
also be given to an array o f factors that are ‘external’ to the property tax
collection process itself.
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We arc thankful to ECLAC for financial support and Juan Pablo Jimenez and Gustavo
Canavire-Bacarrcza for helpful comments. We are also thankful to Andrea Podesta for
useful research assistance.
The taxation o f property comes in m any different modalities and within each one of
them different approaches have been used in the international practice, all o f which
offer different advantages and disadvantages. M any o f these are reviewed in Bird and
Slack (2004) and Bahl et al. (2008a, 2010).
For a detailed description o f property tax systems in Latin America, see De Cesare and
Lazo Marin (2008).
The advantages o f the property tax as a local tax arc reviewed, among m any others, in
O ates (1999), Bird (2006), and Bahl et al. (2008b).
The concept o f equity in the distribution o f income ultimately deals with who bears the
burden of the tax, or the incidence o f the tax. Zodrow (2007) provides a brief review of
the property tax incidence literature.
Based on an empirical analysis encompassing 34 developing countries and 22 developed
countries, Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) suggest that the local governments
might actually contribute to improving the distribution o f income. However, this con
clusion is subject to a public sector playing a significant role in the economy (more than
20% o f the G D P), a condition that is not observed in Latin American countries, where
total expenditures o f the general government represent, on average during 2007, less
than 15% o f the G D P (Penn World Table, Heston e ta l., 2009).
Discussions about the property tax and the characteristics of a good local tax
are discussed, for instance, in McLure (1994), McCluskey and Williams (1999),
McCluskey and Plimmer (2007), Bahl and Bird (2008) and Martinez-Vazquez et al.
(2010).
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) suggest that tax competition has a corrective effect on
the overall amount o f public expenditures, because it limits the natural tendency of
governments to spend more than the efficient am ount.
Oates (2006) provides a more recent discussion about the decentralization theorem
and the channels through which fiscal decentralization can lead to net welfare gains for
society.
See Shah (2004) for a discussion about the possible factors explaining the widespread
decentralization movement am ong developing and transition countries.
In the equality provided by Bahl and M artinez-Vazquez (2008) both sides o f the iden
tity are divided by the G D P. By doing this, the tax collections are expressed in relative
terms, thus the figures for different countries arc com parable and the analysis can
be carried out on a cross-sectional basis. This equality was previously presented, for
instance, in Bahl (1979).
If the collection ratio is assumed to be set at 1 by the tax authorities, then this term
might still have a value different from one, which could be interpreted as a devia
tion of the "true’ market value o f taxable properties due to an inaccurate assessment
o f the value o f taxable properties. In this framework, however, we assume that the
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m arket value is correctly measured and that the collection ratio serves only as a policy
instrument.
The literature reserves the term ‘tax avoidance’ to refer to any legal form of non
compliance. Tax avoidance corresponds to the taxpayers' initiatives to minimize their
tax burden by taking advantage of preferential treatments and exemptions contem
plated in the law. In this model, tax avoidance is accounted for as a reduction o f taxable
market value o f properties, and thus a reduction of the property tax base.
The basic structure o f the traditional tax evasion model is developed by Allingham and
Sandm o (1972) and Srinivasan (1973), and the cost o f enforcement is incorporated by
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987). Two surveys on the theory o f tax compliance are pro
vided by Andreoni et al. (1998) and Sandmo (2005).
A comprehensive review o f the concept o f tax morale and the relevant literature is pro
vided by Torgler (2007).
See, for instance, Fisman and G atti (2002) for an empirical analysis providing strong
support to the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization reduces corruption.
f can be computed as the total am ount o f taxes actually collected am ong all govern
ment units divided by the overall tax base. This definition corresponds to the weighted
average of the effective tax rate for all government units. A different alternative, not
less convenient, consists in computing the benchmark as the simple average o f the effec
tive tax rates for the available sample (of countries or subnational governments). The
weighted average will be expected to be greater (smaller) than the simple average as long
as per capita collections tend to increase (decrease) with the jurisdiction size.
O ther sources o f own-revenue collections (for example, fees and financial debt) are
excluded, without loss o f generality, in order to simplify the analysis. Here we also dis
regard whether the intergovernmental transfers are earmarked or not, but this docs not
alter the fact that any degree of discretion over own-revenue collections translates into
discretion ‘in the m argin’ over the total am ount of government expenditures.
As a corollary o f this result we could say that if intergovernmental transfers increase,
do not change, or decrease tax effort in a jurisdiction, then the demand for public goods
within that jurisdiction has been revealed to be elastic, have unitary elasticity, or be
inelastic.
Equation (7.8) corresponds to a strictly budgetary identity, but it can be modified in
order to model the supply and demand for subnational public goods and services. The
left-hand side would have to incorporate a production function describing the amount
and quality of public goods and services, and in the right-hand side the tax collections
would represent the willingness to pay for these outputs.
For a review and an extensive discussion about the alternative methodologies available
to measure fiscal capacity see. for instance, US ACIR (1986) and Boex and MartinezVazquez (2007).
One might argue that foreign tax policies also affect tax collections because they can
induce the taxpayers to emigrate in order to capitalize on tax advantages. This is espe
cially relevant in cases where taxpayers are very mobile, as in corporations. In any case,
mobility is fully accounted for in this equation by a decrease in the size o f the tax base.
Another way in which foreign tax policies may also affect tax collections is through
spatial tax com petition across countries. In this case tax rates and other policies set in
foreign countries can affect the tax policy choice in any one country.
The choice o f these countries responds to data availability. Both Brazil and Peru
provide public inform ation about subnational finances and basic demographic and
development indicators. The main data sources are the National Treasury of Brazil and
the Ministry o f Econom y and Finance of Peru.
A similar result is found in the analysis of property tax collections at the international
level, which is presented later in this section, and where we discuss possible interpreta
tions in more detail.
The description and sources of the variables used in the analysis, as well as the summary
statistics, are presented in Appendix Tables 7A.3 and 7A.4, respectively.
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25.

Even though this variable does not capture the effective autonom y o f subnational
government, lacking any better option we follow the most common practice in
the decentralization literature and use this variable to proxy for the level of fiscal
decentralization.
26. The data for Chile, within the oval in Figure 7 .1(a), exhibit a distinctive pattern, which
has been accounted for by the country dummy in the econometric specification.
27. In order to account for additional country-specific characteristics we also considered
regional disparities in G D P per capita as an additional control variable. The correla
tion between this variable and property tax collections as a share o f G D P is -0.686,
suggesting that countries with greater regional disparities tend to collect fewer property
taxes. However, we do not present the results for this variable because its inclusion in
the estimating equations drastically reduces the number o f observations.
28. The explicit consideration of the potential tax base might also help to explain the nega
tive sign of the urban population’s coefficient. Once the size o f the tax base has been
accounted for, a negative relationship between urban population and property tax
collections might suggest that urban areas have a greater concentration o f unregistered
properties and exempted taxpayers than is the case in rural areas.
29. The average effect o f development on property tax collections turns out to be positive
when the G D P per capita is US$28,892. T hat point, however, is irrelevant because no
country in the sample reaches that value.
30. Sec Appendix Tables 7A.3 and 7A.4 for a description o f the variables used and
summary statistics.
3 1. The test o f ovcridentifying restrictions was developed for Stata by Schaffer and Stillman
(2006).
32. The only exception is the level o f development, which turns out to be statistically insig
nificant. We cannot know, however, if this change is due to the correction o f a bias
or due to possible collinearity introduced by the instrum entation for the endogenous
variables.
33. The C orruption Perceptions Index is prepared by Transparency International,
and the data can be retrieved from http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/
surveys_indices/cpi.
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A P P E N D I X 7A
Table 7 A. 1

M ain characteristics o f p ro p e rty ta x system s in L atin Am erica

Country

Revenue
assignment

Authority to change
the tax structure

Administration
Cadastre

Billing and
collection

Appeals

Assessment

Formal appeal
processes
at both
government
levels

Market value

Argentina

Provincial and Provincial and local
local govts
governments

Cadastral office

Provincial
and local
governments

Bolivia

Municipal
governments

Central govt
(Ministerio de
Finanzas) along with
municipal governments
Central (rural) Central and municipal
and municipal governments
(urban) govts
Central government
Municipal
governments

Direccion Nacional de
Catastro Urbano

Municipal
governments

Market value

Central (rural) and
municipal (urban) govts

Municipal
governments

Market value

Servicios de Impuestos
Internos (SII)

Central
government
(Treasury)

Brazil

Chile

Area by
Internal Tax
Service, Special location
Appeals Court for land,
construction
on Property
Valuation,
value for
Supreme Court buildings

Colombia

Municipal
governments

Costa Rica

Municipal
governments

Ecuador

Municipal
governments

Guatemala

Central and
municipal
governments

Honduras

Municipal
governments

N ational Congress
defines tax base and
rate. A range o f rates
is established within
which municips are
free to choose

Central govt along
with municipalities'
ability to set rates
Central and municipal
governments

Municipal
governments

Instituto Geografico
Agustin Codazzi
(IGAC)

Municipal
governments
(Secretarias
de Hacienda)

Municipal governments
(Catastro Nacional)

Municipal
governments

Market value

Municipal governments

Municipal
.
governments

Market value

Central government
(Direccion General de
Catastro)

Mainly
central govt.
except for
municipalities
with
technical and
administrative
capacity
Municipal
governments

Market value

Municipal governments

Cadastral
Division,
petition tax
administration

Market value

Market
value, use
o f the land,
location and
improvements

Table 7A. 1

(continued)

Country

Revenue
assignment

Authority to change
the tax structure

Mexico

Municipal
governments

Nicaragua

Municipal
governments

Panama

Central
government
Municipal
governments
and
departments

Paraguay

Administration
Cadastre

Billing and
collection

Appeals

Assessment

State and municipal
governments jointly

Municipal governments

Local
governments
(local
Treasury
offices)

Fiscal
authority
judicial branch

Market value

Central government
with municipalities’
ability to grant
additional exemptions
Central and provincial
governments
Central government
(M inisterio de
Finanzas Publicas)

Comision Nacional de
Catastro

Municipal
governments

Central government

Provincial
governments
Municipal
governments

Mainly central govt,
except for those
municips with technical
and adm. capacity

Cadastral
value

Market value

Municipal
and district
governments
Central
government

Dominican
Republic

Municipal
and district
governments
Central
government

Central, municipal and Central government
(Comision N acional de
district governments
Tasaciones: C O N A T A )
Central government
Central government
(Direccion General del
Catastro Nacional)

Uruguay

Departments

Central and municipal
government, along
with departments

Central govt (rural;
Direccion Nacional
de Catastro) and
departments (urban)

Departments

Venezuela

Municipal
governments

Municipal
governments

Municipal governments

Municipal
governments

Peru

Source:

M artinez-Vazquez et al. (2010).

Market value

Value
greater than
approximately
US$150,000
Market value
plus additional
20% for
improvements
the rural cases
Market value

Decentralization and reform in Latin America

218

Table 7A .2

Region

Estim ates o f potential property tax base by country anti
region, 2000 ( in USS per capita)

Country

Cropland

SA
CA
SA

SA
SA
SA
CA
SA
CA
CA
SA
CA
NA
CA
CA
SA
SA
SA
SA
SA

Latin America
Argentina
Belize
Bolivia
(Plurinational
State of)
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Uruguay
Venezuela
(Bolivarian
Republic of)
The Caribbean
Antigua and
Barbuda
Barbados
Dominica
Dominican
Republic
Grenada
Haiti
Jamaica
St. Kitts and
Nevis
St. Lucia

Cropland +
pastureland

Potential
urban tax
base
Urban
land +
structures*

Potential
base of
the
property
tax

Potential rural tax base
Pastureland

3,632
5,201
1,550

2,754
133
541

6,386
5,334
2,091

18,301
9,298
2,021

24,687
14,632
4,112

1,998
2,443
1,911
5,811
5,263
404
1,697
5,324
1,189
1,195
867
3.256
2,193
1,480
2,113
3,621
1,086

1,311
1,001
978
1,310
1,065
395
218
252
595
721
410
664
1,215
341
210
5,549
581

3,309
3,444
2,889
7,121
6,328
799
1,915
5,576
1,784
1,916
1,277
3,920
3,408
1,821
2,323
9,170
1,667

9,234
10,235
4,665
7,989
2,721
3,935
2,967
3,192
2,934
18,155
1.646
10,551
4,290
5,326
5,571
10,330
13,049

12,543
13,679
7,554
15,110
9.049
4.734
4,882
8,768
4,718
20.071
2,923
14,471
7,698
7,147
7,894
19,500
14.716

1,003

468

1,471

37,151

38,622

190
5,274
1,980

210
553
386

400
5,827
2,366

17,398
14,661
5,480

17,798
20,488
7,846

572
668
824
0

67
112
152
0

639
780
976
0

15,444
576
9,723
34,197

16,083
1,356
10.699
34,197

3,394

108

3,502

13,018

16,520
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Table 7A.2
Region
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(continued)

Country

Potential rural tax base
Cropland

The Caribbean
St. Vincent
Trinidad and
Tobago

Pastureland

Cropland +
pastureland

Potential Potential
urban tax
base of
base
the
property
Urban
land +
tax
structures*

2,106
444

109
54

2,215
498

10,041
13,871

12,256
14,369

1,973
1,848
1.983

1,114
493
1,164

3.086
2,342
3,147

10.608
4.116
11,137

13,695
6,458
14,284

1,232

226

1,458

5,139

6,596

Regional averages
Latin America
Central America (CA)
South and North
America (SA and
NA)
The Caribbean

Note: *As computed by Bahl and Wallace (2010). The tax base reported by the WB
includes other produced capital that we would not tax (durable goods for example). The
WB report follows Kunte ct al. (1998), who assume that urban land corresponds to 33% of
the value of structures and, in turn, that structures correspond to 72% o f the value of total
capital.
Source:

World Bank (2006).
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Table 7A .3

Variable description and data sources

Variable

Description and sources

Property tax
collections
Fiscal
decentralization

Share o f property tax collections over G D P (in percentage)
Source: CEPAL
Share o f subnational expenditures over total government
expenditures (in percentage)
Source: CEPAL
Share o f intergovernmental transfers over total subnational
revenues (in percentage)
Source: CEPAL
Government share o f real G D P per capita (in percentage)
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009)
Based on per capita real G D P (in purchasing power parity,
PPP)
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009)
Based on the sum o f the potential property tax base
for rural and urban areas, as computed in Appendix
Table 7A.2 with data from World Bank (2006). Figures
correspond to year 2000, and are expressed on $US per
capita
Share o f the total population living in urban areas (in
percentage)
Source: World Development Indicators
Competitiveness o f Executive Recruitment: extent to
which subordinates enjoy equal opportunities to become
superordinates
Source: Polity IV Project. 2009. Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions, University o f Maryland,
College Park, available at: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/
cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm
POLITY2 is a modified version o f the POLITY, which
is obtained by subtracting the value o f the scaled value
representing A UT O C R A T IC (range 0 -1 0 ) from the
value o f D EM O CR ATIC (range 0 -10) in order to
provide a unified polity scale ranging from + 10 (strongly
democratic) to -1 0 (strongly autocratic)
Source: Polity IV Project. 2009. Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions, University o f Maryland,
College Park, available at: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/
cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm
Based on population (thousands)
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al.
(2009)

Dependency on
transfers
Government size
Log o f per capita
GDP
Log o f estimated
property tax base

Urban population

Competition for
public positions

Index o f democracy

Log o f population
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(continued)

Variable

Description and sources

Political
competition

It com bines two concepts: the degree o f
institutionalization, or regulation, o f political
com petition, and the extent o f government restriction
on political competition. It ranges from 1 (suppressed
com petition) to 10 (institutionalized electoral)
Source: Polity IV Project. 2009. Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions, University o f Maryland,
College Park, available at: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/
cidcm/iriscr/polity/index.htm
Openness in constant prices: exports plus imports divided
by real G D P per capita; Laspeyres (in percentage)
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009)
PPP over government consumption
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009)

Openness to trade

Price o f government
expenditures
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Table 7A. 4
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Sum m ary statistics

Variable
Property tax
collections

overall
between
within
overall
Fiscal
decentralization
between
within
Dependency on
overall
transfers
between
within
Government size overall
between
within
Log of per capita overall
GDP(PPP)
between
within
Per capita GDP
overall
(PPP)
between
within
Log of estimated overall
property tax base between
(per capita USS
within
of year 2000)
Urban
overall
population
between
within
Competition for overall
political positions between
within
Index of
overall
democracy
between
within
Log of
overall
population
between
within
Political
overall
competition
between
within
Openness to
overall
trade
between
within
Price level o f govt overall
expenditures
between
within

Mean
0.39

21.93

58.62

15.22

8.86

7.690

2.48

74.21

2.71

7.44

10.27

8.27

50.74

40.02

Std dev.

Min

Max

0.21
0.06
0.74
0.20
0.12
0.64
0.06
0.16
0.52
13.86
0.65
47.16
1.17
13.71
44.76
3.78
5.65
30.15
19.09
20.53
93.04
19.03
23.16
89.46
39.44
4.21
69.23
2.92
11.39
22.55
12.47
2.55
18.88
1.74
8.83
19.74
0.42
8.06
9.98
0.41
8.20
9.36
0.19
8.37
9.48
3,164
3,511
21,548
3,639
2,998
12,189
2,600
1,981
17,050
1.41
0.50
3.21
1.41
0.56
3.21
0.00
2.48
2.48
11.21
11.36
1.81
0.53
0.30
0.44
1.81
1.06
1.46
0.96
1.11
0.07
0.99
0.87
0.67
21.99
24.44
8.86
15.67
11.87
10.76

54.66
57.21
69.54
1.00
2.22
1.49
0.00
5.22
2.22
8.60
8.71
10.11
7.00
7.00
7.16
21.22
23.54
28.20
14.04
18.07
6.34

91.80
89.59
79.36
3.00
3.00
3.49
10.00
9.00
10.22
12.15
12.10
10.43
10.00
9.13
9.71
138.80
107.66
81.89
75.44
55.91
66.38

Observations
N=
n=
T-bar
N=
n=
T-bar
N=
n=
T-bar
N=
n=
T-bar
N=
n=
T-bar
N=
n=
T-bar
N=
n=
T-bar

=

115
9
12.8
115
9
12.8
115
9
12.8
115
9
12.8
115
9
12.8
115
9
12.8
115
9
12.8

N=
n=
T-bar =
N=
n=
T-bar =
N=
n=
T-bar =
N =
n=
T-bar =
N=
n=
T-bar =
N=
n=
T-bar =
N =
n=
T-bar =

115
9
12.8
115
9
12.8
115
9
12.8
115
9
12.8
115
9
12.8
115
9
12.8
115
9
12.8

=

=

=

=

=

=

